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INTRODUCTION
Being the target of certain kinds of race discrimination can be
understood, in a perverse way, as a matter of “choice.” As this Essay
will detail, a person can “volunteer” for race discrimination by
choosing to remain complicit with structures of group subordination.
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Nothing may demonstrate this point more than the debate regarding
the new National Basketball Association (“NBA”) dress code.
In this Essay, I focus on the dispute concerning the alleged racial
motivations behind the new NBA appearance code. In particular, I
explore one recurring theme throughout the NBA dress policy debate:
the way in which some Blacks’1 remarks in support of the code have
been used as powerful tools to directly refute other Blacks’ claims that
the code’s enactment was motivated by racial stereotypes.2 I analyze
1
Throughout this Essay, I capitalize the words “Black” and “White” when used
as nouns to describe a racialized group. I do not capitalize these terms when used as
adjectives. Also, I prefer to use the term “Blacks” to the term “African Americans”
because the term “Blacks” is more inclusive. Additionally, “[i]t is more convenient to
invoke the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between
African-American and Northern European-American, which would be necessary to
maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.” Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,
Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4.
2
In another article, Professor Mario Barnes and I address general allegations of
race discrimination through the NBA’s imposition of a new dress code. See generally
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, Lakisha and Jamal Go to Work:
Analyzing Workplace Appearance and Grooming Standards as “Racial Stereotyping”
Under the Mixed Motive Standard of Race and Sex Discrimination (Dec. 8, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). In so doing, we recognize the conflicts
between anti-discrimination law that targets improper stereotyping in the workplace
and anti-discrimination law regarding appearance codes, under which employers are
generally free to enforce their regulations so long as they are applied substantially
equally across gender and race. Specifically, we raise the question of whether
grooming and appearance codes that are alleged to be racially discriminatory should
be evaluated under a new mixed-motive theory of discrimination. We use the NBA
dress code debate as one example to explore our claims that even so-called legitimate
purposes for workplace policies may be premised upon negative stereotypes related to
race and that such policies can improperly attempt to regulate identity by eliminating
traits and behaviors that reflect or reinforce these negative racial stereotypes. See id.
In mixed-motive cases, the employer’s decision is motivated by both legitimate and
illegitimate reasons. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 229, 250 (1989)
(“Each time, we have concluded that the plaintiff who shows that an impermissible
motive played a motivating part in an adverse employment decision has thereby
placed upon the defendant the burden to show that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of the unlawful motive.”).
Under this theory of
discrimination, “the employer has a limited affirmative defense that does not absolve it
of liability, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff.” Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94-95 (2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2003)). “In
order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must ‘demonstrat[e] that
[it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor.’” Id. at 95. Just as Professor Charles Lawrence has explained about
unconscious racism, I must note, however, that many of our ideas regarding
acceptable appearance are unconsciously racialized.
Lawrence explicated the
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this recurring theme as a means of examining the evidentiary power of
what I call “black-on-black” testimony in employment discrimination
cases. As I see it, this theme adds an important layer to our current
understanding about how fact-finding judges and juries may
improperly weigh witness testimony by minorities against other
minorities during their deliberations. Specifically, it exposes the
failure of juries and courts to recognize that black-on-black testimony
may be a type of conscious racial identity performance;3 such failure,
following about unconscious racism:
[M]ost of us are unaware of our racism. We do not recognize the ways in
which our cultural experience has influenced our beliefs about race or the
occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions. In other words, a large
part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by
unconscious racism.
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987); see Angela J. Davis, Prosecution
and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 33-34 (1998)
(contending that “[u]nconscious racism, although arguably less offensive than
purposeful discrimination, is no less harmful. . . . because it is often unrecognizable to
the victim as well as the perpetrator”).
3
Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have written about the work that
people of color do to counter harmful stereotypes about minority identities in
employment environments. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1279-1308 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Working
Identity] (describing how women and people of color attempt to alter their racial
identities in order to prevent discrimination and preempt stereotyping in workplace).
Carbado and Gulati have also more generally addressed the notion of race as a
“performative identity.” Id. Racial identity performances may allow a person of color
to “fit within” the corporate culture more easily, but they never challenge the
underlying racial assumptions about minority workers’ abilities, attitudes, and
commitment. Id.; see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Race to the Top of the
Corporate Ladder: What Minorities Do When They Get There, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1645, 1676-77 (2004) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top] (asserting that
businesses prefer to hire Blacks “who are phenotypically but unconventionally black
— that is to say, people who ‘look’ but do not ‘act’ black”). Carbado and Gulati’s
claim is that “the social meaning of, for example, a black person’s racial identity is a
function of the way in which that person performs (presents) her blackness,” such
that Blacks can choose to accept or reject societal expectations of behaving
“conventionally” — that is, in accordance with predominant stereotypes. Devon W.
Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory: Crossroads,
Directions, and a New Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1771-72 (2003)
[hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, The Law and Economics] (reviewing FRANCISCO VALDES
ET AL., CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)); see also
Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2009-29 (1995) (creating two fictional, black
sisters, Yvonne Taylor and Keisha Akbar, who perform their racial identities
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in turn, may cause this black-on-black testimony to receive more
weight than it should during the fact-finding process.
To this end, I use the debate regarding the NBA appearance code as
a case study to identify three different categories of performative
behavior by Blacks: (1) accommodating,4 which occurs when racial
outsiders accept dominant cultural norms as a means of advancement,
without any concern about or challenge of their potentially racialized
meanings; (2) distancing, which occurs when conforming outsiders
consciously work to distinguish themselves from other racial outsiders
who reject dominant cultural appearance standards and performances;
and (3) resigned modeling, which occurs when racial outsiders do not
necessarily buy into mainstream definitions of culturally acceptable
norms but resign themselves to these norms for the sake of serving as
role models to those in their group who may look up to them.5 I
contend that each of these behaviors constitutes a form of “volunteer
discrimination”6 and must become an integral part of fact-finders’
differently in their corporate workplaces and detailing how Keisha, who “place[d] an
emphasis on her African heritage,” would not be able to assert legal discrimination
because she “arguably was given the same treatment that would have been afforded
anyone who was perceived as unable or unwilling to fit smoothly into the corporate
culture”); cf. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 142
(2003) (“Rather, the discrimination arises in the application of that criterion by
members of the white majority according to dominant definitions of the term.”).
4
I do not use the term “accommodating” as it is understood legally in antidiscrimination disability law. I do not use it to mean “a requirement . . . that
employers make individualized changes in facially neutral rules, structures, or tasks to
enable a protected class member to perform a given job and produce as much output
as non-accommodated coworkers.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,”
Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 836-37
(2003). Rather, I define it as the acceptance of society’s “requirement” that
individuals must adopt mainstream cultural norms if they want to advance in society.
5
See discussion infra Part II.B (describing these performative behaviors in detail).
6
See discussion infra Part II.B. Even though the behaviors I discuss are
conscious, I place “volunteer discrimination” in quotes because I consider these
actions to be more strategic and not truly voluntary. In many ways, these behaviors
are a basic requirement for Blacks who want to achieve traditional success in society.
See, e.g., Flagg, supra note 3, at 2051 (discussing fictional character she created,
Keisha Akbar, and noting: “Keisha confronts a form of race discrimination that is as
pervasive as it is painful: the expectation that she must conform to norms that challenge
her racial sense of self if she is to succeed in her chosen career”) (emphasis added). At
the same time, I acknowledge that these same behaviors, even when the black actor
does not experience them as conscious conduct, may have similar effects in
reproducing structures of subordination. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical
Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America,
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evaluations of testimony from pro-defendant minority witnesses in
race discrimination cases. In fact, looking at the NBA dress code
debate itself, I maintain that, rather than negating allegations of
racism, the reactions of the policy-defending Blacks actually may
highlight the immense pressures that Blacks generally have in our
society to perform their identity in a way that is racially palatable7 —
in other words, accommodating of cultural norms that place what is
perceived as being white at the top of the social hierarchy and what is
perceived as being black at its bottom.
As Professors Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have explained,
“working within an organization necessarily entails negotiating and
performing identity,” and for racial minorities, such performances
require “extra” work in order to counter negative stereotypes that are
attached to minority groups.8 Furthermore, Professor Frank Rudy
Cooper has detailed in his article Against Bipolar Black Masculinity:
Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy how
outsider groups in society have incentives to perform their identities
in ways that help to maintain their place within society’s hierarchies of
race, gender, class, and sexuality.9 For example, middle-class,
heterosexual, black men — who are caught between the bind of the
socially constructed images of the assimilationist “Good Black Man”
and the dangerous “Bad Black Man”10 — receive incentives to perform
their identity in a way that fits the assimilationist ideal of the “Good
Black Man” by downplaying their race and highlighting their social
class in order to maintain their place above black women and gay

95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997) (explaining how people of color may reproduce
subordinating power relations within and among social groups).
7
See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 3, at 1658 (“A person is
racially palatable if she is perceived to be peripherally or unstereotypically nonwhite;
she is racially salient if she is perceived to be centrally or stereotypically nonwhite.”);
see also Emily Houh, Toward Praxis, 39 UC DAVIS L. REV. 905, 910 (2006) (noting that
“members of outsider groups in the workplace often feel compelled to perform and
signal loudly against negative identity-related stereotypes in order to prevent
discrimination based on those stereotypes”).
8
Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1260-61, 1277-79.
9
Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality,
Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 UC DAVIS L. REV. 853, 859-60
(2006).
10
According to Cooper, the “Good Black Man” and the “Bad Black Man” are
defined as follows: “The Bad Black Man is animalistic, sexually depraved, and crimeprone. The Good Black Man distances himself from black people and emulates white
views.” Id. at 857.
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black men.11
Finally, as Professor Mario Barnes and I clarified in our article By
Any Other Name? On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII
Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White,12 racial identity
performance by Blacks who wish to be included in the mainstream
“carries with it [also] the need to . . . distance one’s self from persons
who can challenge one’s identity performance.”13 In fact, I contend
that what has occurred in response to the NBA dress code by some
black players and leaders (even black journalists) may fit within three
different categories of behavior — accommodating, distancing, and
resigned modeling14 — that result in what I call “volunteer
discrimination.”15 I argue that these three different behavioral
categories help to prove my point that some Blacks’ comments and
actions in support of the new NBA dress code do not in themselves
negate the presence of racism within the policy. Instead, such
comments may provide further evidence of discrimination against
minorities based on social constructions of race.16 Rather than
challenging or working to defeat hierarchical, racialized social norms,
these types of performative actions are used by outsiders — here,
Blacks — for the specific purpose of ensuring acceptance within the
dominant society or, at least, the opportunity for traditional success.17
11
Id. at 853, 859-70, 874-88; see also Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769,
772 (2002) (describing how outsiders downplay or “cover” their difference to make
insiders feel comfortable).
12
Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are
White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283.
13
Id. at 1308 n.101.
14
See infra Part II.B.
15
This term is, in part, inspired by the book JILL NELSON, VOLUNTEER SLAVERY: MY
AUTHENTIC NEGRO EXPERIENCE (1994). In her book, Nelson details her experiences as
a black woman working for the Washington Post, where she often found herself with
the dilemma of wanting to promote short-term individual progress within the rules
while at the same time wanting to change the rules themselves. See also infra
Conclusion (discussing this same dilemma within context of dress codes). See
generally NELSON, supra.
16
Devon Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 978
(2002) (defining social construction of race as “the idea that race does not exist at all
antecedently of its invention in culture. . . . [R]ace does not exist outside of, but is
instead the effect of, discourses . . . . [A] particular race consciousness emerges:
namely, that race is real and that everyone has one”).
17
See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1278 (asserting that
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Part I of this Essay describes the new NBA dress code and then lays
the framework for the discussions that ensued after the
implementation of the code. Part II examines how some Blacks’
defense of the allegedly discriminatory NBA appearance policy does
not in itself negate claims of racial discrimination. In so doing, this
Part explicates the various ways in which Blacks are pressured to
perform their racial identity in order to advance in society — in
particular, the ways in which outsiders often must conform to
traditional standards of appearance and must distinguish themselves
from the “bad outsiders” or the “bad Blacks” to succeed within the
dominant culture.18
As a background for understanding the
phenomenon of “volunteer discrimination,” Part II.A analyzes and
explains how race is socially constructed by markers for racial
identity, which include not only skin color, but more importantly,
characteristics that revolve around how one performs his or her race,
such as hairstyle, dress, and voice. Part II.B then explores and probes
the three separate behaviors that I refer to as “volunteer
discrimination” to demonstrate how these distinct acts of
accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling not only do not
contradict claims of racial stereotyping but can actually work to reify
and stabilize racial hierarchies. Part III highlights the importance of
understanding the various incentives behind the three behaviors I
have identified as “volunteer discrimination” when evaluating or
weighing black-on-black testimony within the context of an
employment discrimination case. Finally, I conclude this Essay by
highlighting the dangers of using “voluntary” submission to
discrimination by some outsiders to support claims of nondiscrimination against others. I stress the importance of considering
race in a way that acknowledges, understands, and evaluates claims of
racial discrimination with as much complexity as the actual
functioning of racism, including racial stereotyping, within our
society.
I.

BUSINESS CASUAL, OR CASUALTIES OF BUSINESS AS USUAL?

In October of 2005, Commissioner David Stern issued a new dress
code for players in the NBA,19 an organization of athletes that is nearly
identity performances, though not all of them, are “function[s] of conscious strategic
choices”).
18
See supra note 6.
19
See John Eligon, In NBA, Clothes Dress Up the Image, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005,
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eighty percent black.20 The new code, which specifies appropriate
league-business dress styles for NBA athletes, requires players to wear
“Business Casual attire whenever they are engaged in team or league
business,” meaning: (1) a long or short-sleeved dress shirt (collared
or turtleneck) and/or a sweater; (2) dress slacks, khakis, or dress
jeans; and (3) appropriate shoes and socks, which do not include
sneakers, sandals, flip-flops, or work boots.21 The code also directly
prohibits players from wearing certain types of clothing, in particular,
clothing that society links to hip-hop culture, which has been
negatively stereotyped and racialized as black.22 Specifically, the code
at D5; Dennis Hans, When Mr. Blackwell Meets Mr. Shaqwell, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,
2005, § 8, at 9.
20
See Frank Deford, Suiting Up: NBA Dress Code Draws Criticism from Many
ILLUSTRATED,
Oct.
26,
2005,
available
at
Corners,
SPORTS
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2005/writers/frank_deford/10/26/dress.code; Angela I.
Onwuachi-Willig, Bird Creates Buzz About Race in the NBA: The Importance of Role
Models Is Evident Even in Pro Basketball Careers, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jul. 6, 2004, at B7.
The high percentage of black players in the NBA is remarkable given that the NBA did
not become a desegregated league until 1950, after both professional baseball and
football. See Harry Edwards, The End of the “Golden Age” of Black Sports
Participation?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1007, 1012-13 (1997) (detailing history of racism in
sports). But see Timothy Davis, Racism in Athletics: Subtle Yet Persistent, 21 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 881, 882 (1999) (“Notwithstanding increased participation
opportunities for African-American athletes in professional baseball, football, and
basketball, black Americans’ access to management and ownership positions in those
sports remains negligible.”); Craig T. Greenlee, In Sports, Those Making the Off-Field
Decision Remain Overwhelmingly White, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 16, 1998
(discussing low number of minorities in coaching and management in professional
sports leagues, such as NBA).
21
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, NBA Player Dress Code, http://www.nba.com/news/
player_dress_code_051017.html [hereinafter NBA Player Dress Code]. There are
three exceptions to this Business Casual policy. Id. The first exception is stricter than
the usual policy and requires players who are in attendance at games but not in
uniform to wear a sports coat, dress shoes or boots, and socks while seated on the
bench or in the stands. Id. The second exception allows players to wear either
Business Casual attire or neat warm-up suits that are issued by their teams as they are
leaving a basketball arena. Id. The third and final exception permits players to wear
attire that is not Business Casual at special events or player appearances where other
attire would be appropriate, such as at basketball clinics. Id.
22
See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (1994) (“For
example, seemingly inconsequential acts like listening to rap and wearing hip-hop
fashions constitute a means of racial affiliation and identification.”); Tricia Rose, “Fear
of a Black Planet”: Rap Music and Black Cultural Politics in the 1990s, 60 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 276, 279-80 (1991) (“The social construction of rap and rap-related violence is
fundamentally linked to the social discourse on Black containment and fears of a Black
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prohibits the wearing of sleeveless shirts, shorts, t-shirts, jerseys or
sports apparel, chains, pendants, medallions, sunglasses while indoors,
headphones, and headgear of any kind, while a player is placed on the
bench, seated in the stands at a game, or making an appearance for
media interviews or a team or league event.23
The announcement of the new NBA dress code sparked a number of
claims from players and journalists, including one controversial claim
that policy is motivated by racial stereotypes.24 Commentators and
planet. . . . The terms of the assaults on rap music, . . . are part of a long-standing
sociologically based discourse that positions Black influences as a cultural threat to
American society.”). But see Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of
Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 983, 986 & n.10 (2004) (noting that while most hip-hop
artists are black, “[t]he consumers are mainly non-black” — around 75 percent nonblack); see also Jeffrey A. Williams, Flagrant Foul: Racism in “The Ron Artest Fight,” 13
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 55, 75 (2005) (“Most saliently, middle-class whites form a
significant chunk of the revenue base behind the hip-hop industry.”). The way in
which hip-hop has become racialized as black is also evident in the labels that are
often placed on white rappers like Eminem, such as the terms “wigger” or “wannabe.”
The idea behind these terms is that Eminem is “acting black” by being a part of hiphop. In his song “The Way I Am,” Eminem attacks his critics, rapping:
And I just do not got the patience (got the patience).
To deal with these cocky caucasians who think
I’m some wigger who just tries to be black cause I talk
With an accent, and grab on my balls, so they always keep askin . . . .
EMINEM LYRICS, The Way I Am, on CURTAIN CALL (Aftermath Records 2005), available
at http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/eminem/thewayiam.html. But see Catherine L. Fisk,
Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-examining Appearance Regulation as an
Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (2006) (“[T]he heart of the offense (if
there is an offense) is not that the NBA and the Yankees are discriminating on the
basis of race or gender; the offense (if there is one) is that they are trying to make
players project an image that some players don’t want to project. There may be,
especially in the case of the NBA, an aspect of the dispute that is about discrimination
in the way that people perform racial or gender identity, but there is a larger sense in
which the disputes are not about discrimination, they are about the power to project
an image.”).
23
See NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 21; see also Rose, supra note 22, at 27780 (describing “fly” hip-hop gear as including chunky jewelry and baggy pants).
24
See, e.g., Adrian Wojnarowski, Dis-dress Call; Suddenly, The NBA Doesn’t Like
the Way It Looks, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 20, 2005, at S1. One author
wrote:
[W]hite America had grown so disillusioned with the NBA, so wary of its
young, black players with the understood uniform of hip-hop — cornrows,
tattoos and do-rags.
....
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players alike argued that the code is targeted at negative media-driven
images of young black men, who make up the vast majority of the
league.25 For example, Indiana Pacers guard Stephen Jackson asserted
the following in response to the newly instituted dress code: “I have
no problem dressing up . . . because I know I’m a nice-looking guy.
But as far as chains, I definitely feel that’s a racial statement. Almost
100 percent of the guys in the league who are young and black wear
chains.”26 Jackson further stated, “When we’re talking about big
chains and stuff, it’s obvious who wears those. Not Austin [Croshere].
Not Jeff [Foster],”27 both of whom are white. Boston Celtics forward
Paul Pierce, who willingly complies with the code, agreed with
Jackson, proclaiming, “[W]hen I saw the part about chains, hip hop
and throwback jerseys, I think that’s part of our culture. The NBA is
young black males.”28 One commentator even referred to Jackson’s
“We know who the league is going after right now, and it isn’t Steve Nash
and Mark Cuban,” one NBA official laughed on Wednesday.
No, this desire for a so-called professional dress code isn’t about the MVP’s
thrift-store wardrobe, nor the Dallas owner’s T-shirt and blue jeans
ensemble.
....
After all, those NBA stars aren’t mildly foreboding to people. They don’t
frighten them. They don’t make them change the channel, and tell their kids
to change the channel and find something else to watch. This is the
commissioner’s target. This is about a generation of NBA stars immersed in
the hip-hop culture, inspiring a disconnect with the paying public.
Id.
25
See, e.g., Bob Kravitz, Voicing Protest, No Matter the Issue, Is a Critical Right,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 26, 2005; see also Mark Montieth, Wardrobe Rules Leave
Players Unfazed, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 19, 2005 (quoting Indiana Pacers guard
Stephen Jackson).
26
See Montieth, supra note 25; see also Marc Stein, Pacers’ Jackson Calls Ban on
Chains “Racist Statement,” ESPN, Oct. 18, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/
print?id=2197001&type=story (quoting Jackson as saying, “But it’s one thing to
[enforce a] dress code and it’s another thing if you’re attacking cultures, and that’s
what I think they’re doing”).
27
Kravitz, supra note 25 (quoting Jackson as stating that he will follow new dress
policy). Jackson engaged in a short protest against the new NBA dress code by
wearing four chains at the Pacers’ exhibition game against the San Antonio Spurs on
October 18, 2005. See Michael Lee, New Dress Code Draws a Few Threads of Protest,
WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2005, at E3. Jackson, however, has since abided by the dress
code because, as he states, he is not fond of “giving money back” in fines. See Stein,
supra note 26.
28
Cliff Brunt, Pacer’s Jackson Leads the Chorus of Players Against Dress Code, USA
TODAY, Oct. 19, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketball/nba/2005-10-19-
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comments as he highlighted how the policy seemingly targeted young
black basketball players, stating:
[T]ell me though, what kind of card [other than the “race
card”] is Jackson going to play to protest a policy that
prohibits the use of heavy chains, do-rags, and throwback
jerseys? You think Steve Nash’s closet is bursting with bling?
Can you picture Dirk Nowitizki with a do-rag without
cracking up?29
It is difficult to deny the racial overtones of the NBA’s new dress
code, especially in light of the league’s racial composition30 and the
comments that players, coaches, and pundits have made while
debating the merits of the policy.31 For example, Los Angeles Lakers
head coach Phil Jackson made the following comment, which
essentially displays the way in which young black men, hip-hop, and
criminality have become so linked in the minds of the American
public:32 “The players have been dressing in prison garb the last five
or six years. All the stuff that goes on, it’s like gangster, thuggery

sjackson_x.htm.
29
See Kravitz, supra note 25. The natural questions are: Why did the NBA find it
necessary to include a list of items that are specifically prohibited after the league had
already clearly defined “Business Casual” wear? Why target specific items in the
policy at all?
30
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
31
See generally Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of
Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615 (1995) (arguing that subtle
racism pervades sports such as basketball).
32
See Dwight L. Greene, Naughty by Nurture: Black Male Joyriding — Is
Everything Gonna Be Alright?, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 73, 74-75 (1994) (“Often, a
young Black male is suspected of being a criminal simply based on his status as a
young Black male, rather than because of any act he may have committed.”); see also
R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN. L. REV.
571, 598 (2003) (noting that “[t]he association of blacks with criminality may even
contribute to the tendency to associate other negative characteristics with blacks as
well”); Katheryn Russell-Brown, Black Protectionism as Civil Rights Strategy, 53 BUFF.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (“[T]he prevailing image of Blackness as something loathsome,
marginal, and deviant — the criminalblackman — persists.”). See generally Cooper,
supra note 9, at 875-79 (describing “key aspects of the image of the Bad Black Man” as
being “animalistic, crime-prone, and sexually unrestrained”); N. Jeremi Duru, The
Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1348-63 (2004) (reporting how stereotype of criminal, “Bestial
Black Man” worked in Central Park Five case, in which youth were alleged to be
“singing the Tone Loc hip-hop song, ‘Wild Thing’”).
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stuff.”33 Similarly, black columnist Jason Whitlock declared, “Too
many young, black professional athletes have too closely aligned
themselves with the hip-hop culture, which in reality is nothing more
than prison culture.”34 One comedian even joked about the policy in a
way that worked only to more deeply entrench the media images that
have so often linked black men, especially those who are athletes, with
crime and criminality; he ribbed, “Players can [now] go straight from
the locker room to the courtroom without having to change clothes.”35
But the fact remains that, just as some black basketball players have
spoken out against the policy as motivated by racial stereotypes, other
black players, both former and current, have argued in its favor. For
example, former Dallas Mavericks guard Derek Harper remarked, “I
applaud the commissioner [on the new dress code]. . . . I just think if
you check into the Ritz-Carlton, it’s a five-star hotel, so you should be
a five-star individual going through there.”36
Many other commentators have pointed to statements similar to
Harper’s to support their argument that no connection lies between
racism and the new NBA dress code. For example, Sports Illustrated
columnist Frank Deford argued that former NBA star Charles Barkley’s
comments in support of the appearance code were evidence of no
racism behind the policy. Deford declared that “[e]ven Charles
Barkley, famously on record for telling children not to look up to NBA
players as role models, says the new code is ‘fantastic,’ for it shows
young African American males how best to dress in the wider
world.”37 Moreover, Deford argued that, in light of the fact that teams
headed by former black basketball players themselves have

33
Daniel Wood, NBA Players Cry Foul over New Dress Code, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 26, 2005, at 1, available at http://search.csmonitor.com/2005/1026/
p01s04-ussc.html.
34
Jason Whitlock, NBA Players Should Learn Stern Is on Their Side, KAN. CITY STAR,
Nov. 3, 2005, at D1. There are aspects of hip-hop culture that are closely related to
prison culture — for example, the wearing of loose, baggy jeans. See John L. Mitchell,
Baggin’ and Saggin’: Parents Wary of a Big Fashion Trend, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1992, at
B1 (noting that trend of saggy jeans in hip-hop culture began with people “emulating
the garb of prison inmates whose pants perpetually sag because prisoners are not
issued belts”).
35
Argus Hamilton, Op-Ed., Bush Has Certain Way With Torture Victims, PORTAGE
DAILY REGISTER (Wis.), Jan. 20, 2006, available at http://www.wiscnews.com/
archives/read.php?info=/temp_archive/pdr/2006/01/20/69481.php.
36
Jeff Caplan, Rule Wears Out Its Welcome with Some Whose Slips Show, STAR
TELEGRAM (Fortworth, Tex.), Jan. 20, 2006, at D1.
37
Deford, supra note 20.
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implemented more restrictive dress codes than the league’s general
policy,38 the new NBA dress code cannot and should not be considered
to be racially motivated. In fact, a number of these commentators
include both former and current black NBA athletes and journalists,
who have essentially expressed their support for the new clothing
policy and have cited each other, as well as comments made by other
outspoken Blacks, to deny any racial motivations behind the dress
code.39 Indeed, such action is a strategy that is regularly employed in
attempts to defeat or discredit claims of racism or discrimination by
racial minorities — and often persuasively so.40 The persuasiveness of
such comments, however, is overemphasized, and in the next two
Parts of this Essay, I explain exactly why.
II.

UNDERSTANDING “VOLUNTEER DISCRIMINATION”
A. The Social Meaning of Race

In order to understand how and why black support of the new NBA
dress code does not necessarily negate allegations of racism behind the
policy, one must first appreciate and comprehend how race is defined
and practiced within our society. As Professor Barnes and I detailed in
an earlier article in the Wisconsin Law Review, “race, although
considered primarily in terms of physical features, carries different
meanings based upon societal understandings of particular groups.”41
Race is socially constructed.42
It is formed through human
interactions and commonly held notions of what it means to belong to
a certain racial group.43 In other words, in our society, markers other
38
Id. (asserting that teams such as New York Knicks and Atlanta Hawks, which
are run by former black NBA stars Isiah Thomas and Billy Knight, respectively,
enforce more stringent dress policies than NBA’s policy).
39
See, e.g., Whitlock, supra note 34 (asserting, as black columnist, that “[i]t’s
comical to listen to [NBA players] call Stern’s dress code racist when black-owned
nightclubs have been enforcing similar dress codes (and using metal detectors) for
years just to keep hip-hop thugs out”).
40
See, e.g., Ellison v. Best Foods, 598 F. Supp. 159, 168 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (relying
on positive testimony from other black employees as persuasive evidence that
allegations of discrimination by other Blacks were untrue).
41
See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 12, at 1295.
42
See Haney López, supra note 22, at 11, 27-28; see also Jacquelyn L. Bridgeman,
Defining Ourselves for Ourselves, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1261, 1267-74 (2005).
43
See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S, at 55-60 (2d ed. 1994) (introducing racial formation
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than just one’s skin color, such as dress, hairstyle, and voice, play a
role in defining a person’s race.44 As we have learned from Carbado
and Gulati, when it comes to discrimination, how one performs their
racial identity matters almost as much as how one looks in the postCivil Rights era.45
In fact, the way in which race is socially constructed is most evident
in reporters’ comments regarding the differences between Michael
Jordan’s generation of NBA players and today’s hip-hop branded
basketball players. For example, one writer noted in favor of the new
NBA dress code, “[L]et’s be honest, in a very short period of time, the
snapshot of an NBA player off the court has gone from the impeccable
and classy Michael Jordan to what Phil Mushnick of the New York Post
calls ‘looking like recruitment officers for the Bloods and the Crips.’”46
As this interlocutor’s statement demonstrates, the problem for those

theory, which refers to “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created,
inhabited, transformed, and destroyed,” and analyzing how race is evolving set of
social meanings that are formed and transformed under constantly shifting society);
Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 222, 233 (1996)
(reviewing JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR,
COMMUNITY (1995)) (“Identity is not fixed or absolute; rather, it is determined by
particular persons for particular purposes at particular times in a process in which the
person identified participates with varying degrees of freedom.”); Angela P. Harris,
The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 774 (1994) (“‘[R]ace’ is
neither a natural fact simply there in ‘reality,’ nor a wrong idea, eradicable by an act of
will.”).
44
See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 12, at 1297-1312 (discussing how
people become racialized as black despite their actual skin color based on name and
voice); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1166-71, 1194-99 (2004)
(arguing that courts should hear “claims concerning discrimination based on
voluntarily chosen physical traits or ‘performed’ behaviors that communicate racial or
ethnic identity”).
45
See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1262-63 (“Racial
conduct discrimination derives, not simply from the fact that an employee is, for
example, phenotypically Asian American . . . but also from how she performs her
Asian-American identity in the workplace.”); see also KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE
HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 21-22 (2006); Angela Onwuachi-Willig,
Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. 873, 885-94 (2006); Rich, supra note 44, at 115866.
46
Deford, supra note 20. The irony is, as Professor Timothy Davis has
highlighted, that black NBA players are “both scorned and loved” by the American
public; a “dual existence . . . [that] represents ‘a microcosm of the contradictions of a
segregated society.’” Timothy Davis, Who’s In and Who’s Out: Racial Discrimination in
Sports, 28 PAC. L.J. 341, 347 (1997) (reviewing KENNETH SHOPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND
WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA (1996)).
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who want to impose the new appearance code is not that the players
have black skin — not that they are “black” as that term is physically
defined — but rather that they are performing their identities in a way
that comports with stereotypes accorded generally to Blacks.47 As
Professor Kenji Yoshino detailed in his book Covering: The Hidden
Assault on Our Civil Rights, the face of discrimination and racial
acceptability has changed.48 He explained, “We are at a transitional
moment in how Americans discriminate. . . . [I]ndividuals no longer
need[] to be white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied; they
need[] only to act white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-bodied.”49
In essence, aspiring to be like a racially palatable Michael Jordan, who
in many ways has been given the status of an “honorary White,”50 is
acceptable, but even looking like a person who is outside of that
“classy” image is not.51 This pressure to perform one’s identity such
that it cuts against black racial stereotypes gives new meaning to the
slogan, “Be like Mike.” Today, it is not the black man himself who is
not worthy of inclusion, but primarily just the black man who fails to
conform to traditional notions of white, middle-class masculinity.52
47
See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 3, at 1675-78; OnwuachiWillig & Barnes, supra note 12, at 1314-16.
48
See YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 21-22.
49
Id.; see also Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 387-88 (explaining that “stereotypes arise most
often not from immutable traits but from negative associations with those traits”).
50
See TODD BOYD, YOUNG, BLACK, RICH, AND FAMOUS: THE RISE OF THE NBA, THE HIP
HOP INVASION, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 152 (2003) (“Jordan
had become an acceptable Black media icon who transcended cultural barriers around
the globe. In order for him to be so widely embraced, he had to offer an image that
was potentially appealing to multiple parties simultaneously.”); see also Cheryl I.
Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith —
Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 236 (1996) (discussing how African
Americans who are accorded status of honorary Whites have type of racial
invisibility).
51
See Williams, supra note 22, at 65 (“It was not simply that so many of the
athletes were black; it was that they dressed the part; and sold those shoes, their
shorts, those shirts and their voices.”); see also BOYD, supra note 50, at 53 (“America
seemed ready to accept Black celebrities if they conformed to the prevailing standards
prescribed for them.”); cf. Fisk, supra note 22, at 1120 (“There may be, especially in
the case of the NBA, an aspect of the dispute that is about discrimination in the way
that people perform racial or gender identity, but there is a larger sense in which the
disputes are not about discrimination, they are about the power to project an image.”).
52
See YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 134-35. In his new book, Yoshino quotes John
T. Molly, the author of the book New Dress for Success.
Molloy explained the
following about why racial minorities should engage in appearance-based covering,
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The fact is that people of color have incentives to act on these social
understandings of race as a means of avoiding or minimizing the
discrimination that they may encounter in their daily lives. For
example, many professional black men make a special effort to wear
suits or traditional, professional clothing when they are in public
settings in order to minimize the discrimination that they may
experience just based on appearance — their skin color, height, and
other physical characteristics. After all, the black man in the Brooks
Brothers suit is less likely to be followed in a department store than
the black man in jeans or sweats, though both are highly likely to be
viewed as suspicious despite their dress.53 Likewise, women of all
which is dressing in a style that downplays their racial identity:
It is an undeniable fact that the typical upper-middle class American looks
white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant. He is of medium build, fair complexion,
with almost no pronounced physical characteristics. He is the model of
success; that is, if you run a test, most people of all socioeconomic racial and
ethnic backgrounds will identify him as such. . . . Anyone not possessing his
characteristics will elicit a negative response to some degree, regardless of
whether that response is conscious or subconscious.
Id. (quoting JOHN T. MOLLOY, NEW DRESS FOR SUCCESS 234 (1988)). In fact, as Molloy
describes in his book, when he wrote a report to advise a group of black executives in
Chicago about dress at work, he gave the report the title of “Dress White.” JOHN T.
MOLLOY, NEW DRESS FOR SUCCESS 233 (1988). That title was later changed to “Dress
Very White” after one of the black executives informed Molloy that most of the
workshop attendees already understood that they must dress white. Id. at 234. Such
understandings by these black executives would also help to explain why black men
such as Isiah Thomas and Billy Knight would adopt even more stringent dress codes
for their teams than the general NBA code. Perhaps, Thomas and Knight understand
that their players, who are primarily black, must not just “dress white” but must
“dress very white.” See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
53
See Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class, and Surburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a
“Race-Making Situation,” 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 797-98 (2002) (detailing how
even professionally dressed Blacks are routinely followed in stores); see also Kevin R.
Johnson, The Case for African American and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Racial
Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 344 (2003) (“Racial profiles punish,
embarrass, and humiliate innocent people, whose skin color is used as a proxy for
criminal conduct.”). Professor Patricia Williams related her story of being informed
by a white store clerk in Benetton, who had looked her over, that the store was closed
when another customer, who was white, was inside shopping. See PATRICIA J.
WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 45-46 (1991). Also, billionaire Oprah
Winfrey was reportedly prevented from entering a Hermès store in Paris because the
store had been having problems with North African women. See James Ragland, Black
Shoppers Feel They’re Unwelcome, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 7, 2005, at 7E (“The
Oprah incident renewed talk about racial profiling in stores. The study found that 56
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races are less likely to cross the street or clutch their purses when they
see a black man in a Prada suit versus one in Phat Farm54 sweats,
though women are highly likely to cross the street and clutch their
purses in either situation.55 Famously, Larry Mungin, the subject of
the book The Good Black: A True Story of Race in America,56 dressed in
traditional, professional clothing as often as he possibly could in his
former suburban neighborhood in Alexandria, Virginia as a means of
signaling to his white neighbors that he was a “good Black” — a safe
Black.57 As Mungin explained, when he was wearing a suit, his
neighbors would greet him with nods, but when he was dressed to
work out at the gym, those same people would “visibly tense up,” and
percent of black respondents sensed that store clerks or security guards were watching
them more closely than other customers. By comparison, 40 percent of Hispanic and
17 percent of white respondents say the same thing.”); see also Mary Mitchell, In Paris,
Not Even Oprah Can Escape the Reality of Being Black, CHI. SUN TIMES, Jul. 3, 2005, at
14; Ragland, supra (noting that Latina/os reported feeling most discomfort in stores,
Blacks reported feeling discomfort in stores at nearly same percentage rate as
Latina/os, and that Whites reported feeling discomfort in stores at significantly lower
percentage than Latina/os and Blacks).
54
Phat Farm is a clothing company and brand born out of the hip-hop style that
was created by Russell Simmons, the founder of Def Jam Records. Phat Farm clothing
is very expensive and is likely to be worn by men of middle class or upper middle
class stature. Despite the expense of the clothes, however, it may not convey the same
signal of “safety” as a Brooks Brothers suit would, but rather may convey an image of
“danger” because of its association with hip-hop.
55
See Regina Austin, Beyond Black Demons and White Devils: Anti-Black
Theorizing and the Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021, 1024-25 (1995)
(“The effect of the demonization is also apparent in myriad mundane examples; for
instance when white people encounter black males on the street, the men often clutch
their women while the women clutch their purses.”); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness
and Women, In Practice and Theory: A Response to Catherine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 217, 243 n.135 (1993) (describing racialized social meanings behind actions
of women who clutch their purses when black men are walking toward them, actions
which exhibit “a pattern of social treatment of these men as dangerous, dishonest,
criminal”); see also Carbado, supra note 16, at 949-50 (describing how women have
clutched their purses or crossed street upon seeing him). See generally ELLIS COSE,
THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993) (describing how black professional men
experience these daily microaggressions).
56
PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999).
57
Id. at 41-42. Different kinds of clothing convey varying levels of acceptability.
For example, my colleague and friend Mario Barnes, a black man, has remarked that
women cross the street even when he is nicely dressed but find him “least scary in
[his] Navy uniform — a symbol that makes him more palatable than a nice suit.” Email from Mario Barnes, Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of
Law, to Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa
College of Law (Mar. 23, 2007, 21:29:00 EST).
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“[o]n the elevator, some women would punch the control panel and
get off on the next floor, or clutch their handbag to their chest.”58 In
essence, Mungin understood that, unlike white men, he had to dress
in a certain manner — for example, wear a suit — in order to ease his
white neighbors’ tensions; he had to show them that he was one of the
“good Blacks,” or rather, that he was just like them, having achieved
the status of an honorary White.
Likewise, many black women choose not to wear their hair in Afros,
braids, or locks to avoid the perception that they are “too ethnic,” are
“angry black women,” or are unworthy of inclusion.59 Black men, too,
are subject to stereotyping for these hairstyles, only they, along with
being perceived as militant and angry, are also viewed as unkempt,
drug-using, and lazy based on such styles.60 In fact, at the Tenth

58
BARRETT, supra note 56, at 42. While describing his experiences in Alexandria
to Barrett in The Good Black, Mungin proclaimed the following strong words:

I’m black, so they think I’m going to rob or rape them. But I’m the same
person who walks in with the Armani suit. Don’t they see me? The answer
is no. They see a black man. I am the one who is robbed. I am robbed of
my reputation because of the color of my skin.
Id. Upon moving to a different job in a different area that did not require professional
clothing, Mungin described his experience as follows: “No more am I in Georgetown,
dressed like a professional and at least getting some respect on the street. . . . I’m out
in Chantilly, Virginia, or wherever, and the secretaries are afraid I’m going to attack
them as they go to get in their cars.” Id. at 148.
59
See Sandi Farrell, Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the
Ideology of Voluntarism in Title VII Jurisprudence, 92 KY. L.J. 483, 525-27 (2004)
(explaining why black woman may choose to straighten her hair, “the most
assimilative choice”); Mary Ellen Maatman, Listening to Deaf Culture:
A
Reconceptualization of Difference Analysis Under Title VII, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 269,
296-97 (1996) (noting that “many employers admit that they regard a nonethnic,
straightened hairstyle as ‘professional,’ and braids as unacceptable”); cf. Caldwell,
supra note 49, at 367 (discussing case in which Hyatt hotel prohibited “‘extreme and
unusual hairstyles,’” which included braided hairstyles).
60
See Kimberly Jade Norwood, The Virulence of Blackthink and How Its Threat of
Ostracism Threatens Those Not Deemed Black Enough, 93 KY. L.J. 143, 164 n.54 (2005)
(noting, for example, that tavern in St. Louis would not allow two black men with
dreadlocks in their establishment on ground that one cannot wash dreadlocks and
tavern owner did not want “stinky” people in his establishment); see also Eatman v.
United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving
employer’s appearance code that required all drivers with “unconventional” and
“unbusinesslike” hairstyles, which included locks and braids, to wear hats over their
hair and noting that 17 of 18 employees required to wear hats were African American,
but finding no discrimination in policy because it applied equally to people of all
races).
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Annual Latina/o Critical Theory conference, one junior professor
revealed his story about how he entered the law teaching market twice
with long, dreaded locks, only to end up with no offers for an
academic job at the end of his searches, but received an academic job
offer the next year after he had completely cut off his locks.61
Other Blacks have masked their accent on phones, speaking in what
they and others perceive to be white, standard English and with a
“white” accent, even if that is not their usual tone, to avoid
discrimination.
For example, Professor Randall Kennedy has
described how his mother used her regular, standard English voice
over the phone to pass as white and receive proper treatment.62
Likewise, The Good Black’s Larry Mungin often made sure that he
spoke “with a precision that guaranteed his being described as ‘very
articulate’” to demonstrate to Whites that he is “a black person who
doesn’t use street vernacular”63 — again, not one of the “bad Blacks,”
but rather one who fits in, one who is accommodating. More recently,
Senator Joseph Biden’s comments about Senator Barack Obama as a
presidential candidate highlighted the way in which “articulateness” is
often considered synonymous with “acceptability” for Blacks.64 More
61
See E-mail from D. Aaron Lacy, Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University,
Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, to Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Associate Professor of
Law, University of Iowa College of Law (Mar. 19, 2007, 12:28:00 EST) (on file with
author).
62
See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND
ADOPTION 290 (2003) (describing how his mother would “pass” over phone because
listeners imagined she was white); see also Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1130, 1145 (2000) (“This is similar to what happened in my Tennessee roommate
anecdote, in which the telephone veiled my race.”); Thomas Purnell et al., Perpetual
and Phonetic Experiments on American English Dialect Identification, 18 J. LANGUAGE &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 10, 11, 22 (1999) (conducting study that measured impact of Chicano
English, African American Vernacular English, and Standard American English
dialects on access to rental housing in four San Francisco and Bay Area communities
and showing that qualified black and Chicano renters were discriminated against in
rental market in certain white residential areas because of dialect).
63
BARRETT, supra note 56, at 41.
64
In an interview on January 31, 2007, Biden stated the following about Obama:
“I mean, you got the first mainstream African-American who is articulate and bright
and clean and a nice-looking guy. I mean, that’s a storybook, man.” Jason Horowitz,
Biden Unbound: Lays into Clinton, Obama, Edwards, N.Y. OBSERVER, Feb. 5, 2007, at 1;
see also Eugene Robinson, An Inarticulate Kickoff, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2007, at A15
(“The word articulate is being used to encompass not just speech but a whole range of
cultural cues — dress, bearing, education, golf handicap. It’s being used to describe a
black person around whom white people can be comfortable, a black person who not
only speaks white America’s language but is fluent in its body language as well.”).
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so, it revealed how a black person’s acceptability within the white
mainstream extends beyond single factors such as voice or
articulateness; acceptability is instead premised on the overall
perception of a black person’s racial identity as displayed by a variety
of markers. As several commentators, including Obama, indicated,
past black presidential candidates such as Jesse Jackson, Sr., and Al
Sharpton are clearly articulate, but the word “articulate” was not being
offered to describe speech alone, “but a whole range of cultural cues
— dress, bearing, education, golf handicap. . . . Articulate [was] really
a shorthand way of describing a black person who isn’t too black —
or, rather, who comports with white America’s notion of how a black
person should come across.”65
The fact is that race has a greater meaning than skin color or tone; it
is also about performance — how one displays his or her racial
identity.66 Blacks who wish to be accepted by mainstream white
society and do not want to be discriminated against have a tremendous
incentive to perform their racial identities in ways that place them in
closer proximity to what is perceived as whiteness.67 Unfortunately,
the end result is that such incentives encourage Blacks to submit
themselves to what I have defined to be “volunteer discrimination.”
B. The Roles of Black Folks
But one may ask, “What is the harm of this ‘volunteer
discrimination’ if it ultimately means inclusion for those who conform
to commonly held notions of middle-class whiteness?” Why should
we not accept supportive comments by Blacks who have conformed to
65

Robinson, supra note 64, at A15. Senator Obama stated, “I didn’t take Senator
Biden’s comments personally, but obviously they were historically inaccurate.
African-American presidential candidates like Jesse Jackson, Shirley Chisholm, Carol
Moseley Braun and Al Sharpton gave a voice to many important issues through their
campaigns, and no one would call them inarticulate.” Id.
66
See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1279-1308 (describing
how actions of women and people of color in attempting to alter their perceived racial
identities is form of discrimination); see also Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk?,
2007 WISC. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 28-29, on file with author)
(describing how Blacks are complimented when their identity performance interferes
with socially constructed stereotypes of Blacks).
67
See Carbado & Gulati, Race to the Top, supra note 3, at 1676-77. But see Frank
Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”: Performing Masculinity in Terry v. Ohio 18-19 (Feb.
9, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (explaining how some gang
members seek to be intimidating in their identity performance and thus may actually
act in accordance with racial stereotype).
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these norms as clear evidence of no improper racial motivations
behind the new NBA dress policy? Viewing black support of the new
NBA dress code as a negation of racial stereotyping claims has broad
appeal for many reasons. First, in a time and age when the American
public, especially white Americans, are uncomfortable talking about
race,68 it is much easier to point to non-complaining minorities as
rational and discount complaining minorities as ultrasensitive or, as
the saying goes, of “playing the race card.” Additionally, as Professor
Richard Ford may contend, the remarks by pro-dress code Blacks
symbolize a rejection of socially imposed racial definitions that may
unfairly “encourage[] members of minority groups to define
themselves in terms of group stereotypes” and may alienate group
members who do not believe a particular behavior is essential to their
racial identity.69 Finally, analyzing the imposition of the new NBA
dress code as a clear issue of non-discrimination allows one to ignore
the full complexity of racism. For example, it allows one to avoid the
difficult task of grappling with the notion that arguments against the
policy as racially driven also can, in a way, play into racist notions that
Blacks do not dress in traditional, professional wear or can never look
professional. As Philadelphia 76ers forward Chris Webber argued,
“For everybody to say that [the code] is racist, what you’re saying to
me is that the black man can’t be fresh or flower, can’t have a suit on, .
. . [T]o say that we can’t wear suits, . . . that’s racial.”70
Although Webber is correct to assert that the inference that a black
man cannot wear a suit is racist, he is incorrect in saying that labeling
the code as racially motivated necessarily suffers from that same
inference. One can certainly acknowledge and understand the fact
that many black men may feel more comfortable or “at home” in a
Brooks Brothers suit than in Russell Simmons wear without implying
that no black man can really wear a suit. To argue that the
implementation of the code is improperly influenced by race is not to

68

See Clarence Page, Online NewsHour: Essay: Left Behind (PBS television
broadcast Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/essays/julydec05/page_9-22.html (“Americans are uncomfortable with talk about race and even
less comfortable talking about class.”).
69
RICHARD FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 25, 31 (2005).
70
Joe Juliano, Webber: Black Men Can Wear Suits, Too, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Oct. 23, 2005, at E3; see also Fisk, supra note 22, at 1135 (“The essentialism of
discrimination analysis is its reliance on the idea that certain appearance conventions
are ‘white’ or ‘black’ or ‘male’ or whatever. Some whites and some blacks can wear
their hair in an Afro, some of both races cannot.”).
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say that “real black men” do not wear Brooks Brothers clothing.
Rather, it highlights the fact that one of the primary means for black
men to counteract their default position in society as dangerous,
criminal, and uneducated is to dress in a fashion that is perceived as
being white (but is in fact race-less) and distance themselves from
those black men who fail to assimilate by wearing hip-hop gear.
More to the point of this Essay, to argue that some Blacks’ support
of the controversial policy cancels out any claims of racial
discrimination misses the very danger in today’s new forms of
discrimination.71 For one thing, it ignores the fact that Blacks who
wish to be deemed “good” have every incentive to accept dominant
cultural norms as “right” and to distance themselves from those within
their group who challenge these norms. Furthermore, it overlooks a
broad history of “volunteer discrimination” by Blacks who have
engaged in the acts of accommodating, distancing, and resigned
modeling for the very purpose of gaining acceptance, no matter how
limited, within mainstream circles.
This Part of the Essay defines and describes the acts of
accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling and the reasons
why Blacks may engage in these forms of behavior to avoid
discrimination for themselves or to help prevent it for younger Blacks
who may look up to them. Part II.B.1 considers the behavior of
accommodating, in which actors simply assume or accept the merit
behind definitions of culturally acceptable standards without
challenge. Actors who “accommodate” encourage others to conform
their behaviors to socially acceptable appearance standards, regardless
of any potentially racialized meanings or, rather, in spite of such
racialized meanings. Part II.B.2 explores the action of distancing,
which, in a sense, is a required extension of the act of accommodating,
in that it requires those who fit the mold — at least as much as
outsiders can — to distance themselves from those who are even
further outside the societal norm. Blacks who engage in distancing
may or may not buy into the merit of culturally defined standards of
acceptability, but they recognize the need to adhere to and follow such
standards to succeed, especially in a way that publicly displays their
71
See YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 21-22 (describing the pressure to downplay
outsider identities as one emerging form of discrimination); see also LU-IN WANG,
DISCRIMINATION BY DEFAULT: HOW RACISM BECOMES ROUTINE 8-9 (2006) (“First, like a
default in the traditional sense, we often discriminate through failure or neglect,
reaching a bad result not through ill will or evil purpose, but because we are unaware
of our failing or are incapable of doing differently.”).
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difference from those who do not perform socially acceptable
behaviors. Part III.B.3 then analyzes the work of resigned modeling.
Actors who engage in resigned modeling may reject mainstream
cultural definitions of socially acceptable performance or may
recognize the ways in which socially acceptable norms can be
racialized, but they resign themselves to conformity specifically for the
sake of modeling behavior to members of their outside group who may
look to them as role models for success. These actors do not buy into
culturally acceptable norms as defined by society, but they, like their
accommodating and distancing counterparts, “volunteer” themselves
for such discrimination because they see no way around performing
their identity in a way that adheres to these norms.
1.

Accommodating

One of the reasons why some Blacks’ support of the new NBA dress
code does not necessarily signify the absence of racial stereotyping is
the incentive that many Blacks have to engage in the act of
“accommodating,” or what I define as a practical acceptance of
dominant cultural norms for the sake of advancement and inclusion.72
What is at issue for the accommodating individual is acceptance from
the dominant racial group or at least a tolerance that can enable
traditional success by Blacks who are willing to conform. The
accommodating individual cares only about how to achieve acceptance
or tolerance through an adherence to mainstream norms, not about
whether those norms are right or improperly racialized or about how
one should proceed in questioning those norms. These actors are
strategic, asking first only what is deemed appropriate by mainstream
standards and then shaping their behaviors in ways that fit into these
socially acceptable molds.
The act of accommodating has long historical roots within the black
community. For example, Booker T. Washington, who emerged as a
leader of the black community during the post-Reconstruction era,73
adopted the philosophy of accommodation or accommodating as a

72

See supra Introduction.
See August Meier, Negro Class Structure and Ideology in the Age of Booker T.
Washington, 23 PHYLON 258, 258 (1962) (describing Washington’s philosophy as
being that “[o]nce Negroes had proven their ability to help themselves, to acquire
wealth and respectability, it was believed, prejudice and discrimination would wither
away”); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 825 (asserting that
Washington rejuvenated black nationalism during the post-Reconstruction era).
73
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means of survival and encouraging the advancement of black people.74
As I explained in a previous article, “The ideology of Washington . . .
was as follows: ‘If [Blacks] play by [Whites’] rules, and prove [their]
worthiness according to [white] standards, [Whites] will have no
choice but to accommodate [Blacks].”75
Likewise, as one
commentator asserted about David Stern’s “Eureka moment” on the
new NBA dress code, the idea for the policy was that “[if] the players
dress[ed] better and look[ed] more responsible in public, they
[would] be more appealing across the board and in the board rooms of
Corporate America.”76
In our society, it does not matter if the accommodating individual
truly believes in the defined acceptable norms; rather, what is critical
is that the accommodating individual understands and knows that the
onus is on him or her to conform to these norms to advance. As
Yoshino explained about how John T. Molloy’s book New Dress for
Success revealed Blacks’ incentives to “accommodate” in order to
succeed:
Success, it seems, is white and bland. Molloy describes the
continuing vitality of white supremacy in American culture, a
supremacy that requires racial minorities to bend behavior
toward Anglo conformity. Indeed . . . racial minorities must
go ‘somewhat overboard’ to compensate for immutable
differences from the white mainstream.77

74
See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the SCT?: What Justice
Clarence Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REV. 931,
941-42 (2005); see also Jeffrey Louis Decker, The State of Rap: Time and Place in HipHop Nationalism, 34 SOC. TEXT 53, 56 (1993) (“The key, as technocrat Booker T.
Washington understood it, was to imitate white institutions within the black
community.”).
75
Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 74, at 941 (quoting Peter Eisenstadt, Introduction
to BLACK CONSERVATISM: ESSAYS IN INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY, at xv (Peter
Eisenstadt ed., 1999)); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring:
Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as a Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV.
1647, 1662-63 (2005) (describing how many former slaves during post-bellum period
acted on “[t]he desire to prove themselves worthy of membership in society as truly
free citizens by conforming to white marriage laws and customs”).
76
Tim Kawakami, Dress Code Isn’t the Answer for NBA’s Image Problem, MERCURY
NEWS, Oct. 27, 2005, at SP1.
77
YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 135 (quoting MOLLOY, supra note 52, at 233) (noting
that Molloy, based on his research of grooming in corporate America, reported “that
‘blacks had not only to dress more conservatively, but also more expensively than
their white counterparts if they wanted to have an equal impact”); see also Carbado &
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In other words, it is the outsider individual who must be
accommodating, not those within the dominant culture.78 As a
consequence, for the accommodating individual or group, racialized
norms are never truly challenged.
One especially poignant example of accommodating behavior by
Blacks that fails to question the potential racism behind societal norms
on appearance is the hair policy that Hampton University, a
prestigious historically black university in Virginia, implemented for
students in its five-year Bachelor of Arts, Masters of Business
Administration program. The policy, which was created in 2000,
provides that “[b]raids, dreadlocks and other unusual hairstyles are
not acceptable.”79 The idea behind the policy is that students at
Hampton need to learn and abide by the appearance standards of a
predominantly white corporate world, so that “[w]hen they get into
corporate America, the transition will be easier.”80
Despite resistance from students, faculty, and staff on campus,81 and

Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1276 (noting, for example, that law firms
promote those people who “will not threaten the status quo”); Gowri Ramachandran,
Intersectionality as “Catch 22”: Why Identity Performance Demands Are Neither
Harmless nor Reasonable, 69 ALB. L. REV. 299, 336 (2005) (noting that unlike minority
professionals, white employees are free from constraint of having to dress “hyperprofessionally”).
78
See John M. Kang, Deconstructing the Ideology of White Aesthetics, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 283, 283 (1997) (“The consequence of this power dynamic is that the
dominant group, Whites, can exercise preferences in deciding how to look or express
themselves, whereas people of color are limited to either conforming to an imposed
White standard or rejecting it.”).
79
Ieesha McKinzie, Hampton Business School Sticks by Requirement for
“Conservative”
Hairstyles,
BLACK
C.
WIRE,
Mar.
27,
2006,
http://www.blackcollegewire.org/news/060327_hampton-hair/.
80
Tamara Dietrich, HU Policy on Hair Might Be Better with a Trim, DAILY PRESS
(Newport, Va.), Apr. 23, 2006, at C1 (quoting Dean of Hampton School of Business).
81
For example, Sean Linder, a sophomore in the program, described the policy as
“a way of making African Americans assimilate to the mainstream standards ‘what is
professional and what is not.’” See McKinzie, supra note 79. Linder, who was initially
asked to sit in the back of the classroom when he did not comply with Hampton
School of Business’s hairstyle policy by wearing his hair in twists, opted to complete
extra work and assignments in order to make up missed seminars for classes he was
not allowed to attend because of his violations of the policy. Id. (quoting Linder as
saying “I noticed everyone back there [in the classroom] had ethnic hairstyles”).
The fact that a historically black university — a school that normally espouses great
pride in African and African American culture and heritage — has instituted a policy
that targets black ethnic hairstyles is very strong proof of the great incentives that
Blacks have to engage in the act of accommodating.
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even Susan Taylor, editorial director of the popular black women’s
magazine Essence,82 the Dean of the business school at Hampton, Sid
Credle, has refused to change the policy. Instead, he has strongly
expressed support for the policy, arguing that a “clean-cut” look is an
asset for any student who seeks advancement in the corporate world.83
Again here, much like the argument made by black NBA dress code
supporters, the argument in favor of Hampton School of Business’s
hairstyle policy is that the students must change to accommodate
corporate norms, not that corporate norms must be open to clean and
well-groomed, ethnic hairstyles that may be primarily worn by Blacks
or other minority racial groups.84 Vincent Vaughn, a senior in the
program, proclaimed, “At the time when I cut [my dreadlocks], I
figured there has to be some sacrifice in order to progress.”85
Likewise, Dean Credle has repeatedly declared that these acts of
accommodating are necessary for fitting into and succeeding within
the corporate culture. As Dean Credle contended, “Braids and
cornrows could set you back. . . . The first thing they (interviewers)
see is your appearance.”86 Many students in the program continue to

82
See Posting of Allen Johnson to News & Record Staff Blogs, A Hair-Raising
Debate,
http://blog.news-record.com/staff/outloud/archives/2006/04/a_hairraising_
d.html (Apr. 13, 2006, 10:21 EST) (noting that Taylor had “balked at a speaking
engagement at historically black Hampton University over the school’s ban of certain
hairstyles in its MBA program”).
83
See McKinzie, supra note 79; see also Dietrich, supra note 80 (noting that Dean
Credle said that policy is “to help groom [the students] for the button-down, clean-cut
corporate world to which they were headed”).
84
See McKinzie, supra note 79. Junior marketing major Chris Roy argued, “Even
though we [Blacks] made a lot of progress as far as social norms, I still think dreads or
a ‘fro will make it more difficult to be viewed in the same light as an applicant that fits
the mold. . . . Your hair has nothing to do with your intelligence, but there are
preconceptions that people may have about you.” Id. Roy agreed with the Dean that
“African Americans need to be a step ahead of their competition, even if it means
sacrificing a hairstyle.” Id.
85
Id.; see also Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1264-68
(describing how workers may compromise their sense of identity). Another
commentator described his friend’s argument in favor of Hampton’s policy, stating:
“[My friend] countered that the business world does not see either [tastefully styled
braids or dreadlocks] as standard-issue hairstyles. When in the business world, she
added, you do as the business people do. That’s how you get a job and it’s how you get
ahead.” Johnson, supra note 82 (emphasis added).
86
See McKinzie, supra note 79. One anonymous blogger noted the following
about the policy: “Now define professional — my definition might include dreads and
braids, but how many black owned corporations are out there really? Reality check —
we live in a white man’s world.” Posting of Anonymous #6 to The Polls: Opinions
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make similar statements in support of what I define as an act of
accommodating through the hair policy. For example, Tuesday Tibbs,
a junior, said it best when she proclaimed that she simply “follows the
‘When in Rome, do as the Romans do’ philosophy.”87 To put it simply,
outsiders — here, Blacks — must accommodate if they want to
advance.
Unfortunately, while the act of accommodating may allow
mainstream success for conforming Blacks, one must ask at what cost
does this success come to those Blacks who would find such
performances to be a negation of self.88 As Susan Taylor explained,
“Trying to transform [ourselves] to fit into hardly welcoming
environments has scarred countless numbers of Black people.”89
Indeed, one commentator argued the following about the Hampton
policy: “To categorically deny males the right to wear dreads or braids
smacks of cultural suffocation.”90 In light of these effects and the
racial undertones driving the need for some Blacks to engage in
accommodating, it makes little sense for commentators then to turn
around and use what essentially may be cultural suffocation for many
Blacks as determinative ammunition against claims of racial
stereotyping behind a policy, whether instituted by Whites or by
Blacks91 — in this case, not only the NBA appearance code, but also
Hampton School of Business’s hairstyle policy.
2.

Distancing

Another reason for not using black support of the new NBA dress
code as proof of no racial stereotyping behind the policy is the

and Comments on Issues, http://www.soulciti.com/poll.php?view=1&pollid=70 (Apr.
21, 2006, 16:44 CST).
87
See McKinzie, supra note 79.
88
See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1260-68, 1277-79. Of
course, there are some Blacks for whom such behavior is not self-negating, but just
the act of being one’s self. See YOSHINO, supra note 45, at 189 (explaining that “the
covering concept might assume too quickly that individuals behaving in ‘mainstream’
ways are hiding some true identity, when in fact they might just be ‘being
themselves’”).
89
Richard Prince, Maynard Institute, Hair Wars: Susan Taylor Protests School’s No
Braids Policy (Apr. 12, 2006), http://www.maynardije.org/columns/dickprince/
060412_prince/.
90
McKinzie, supra note 79.
91
See Norwood, supra note 60, at 164 n.52 (noting that “Blacks can negatively
stereotype Blacks as well”).
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attraction for some Blacks to engage in a behavior I call “distancing.”
Distancing involves actions or comments by outsiders — again, here
Blacks — that are made or done to demonstrate to the dominant group
that the outsider is a “good Black,” not a “bad Black” — in fact, one
who does not speak, dress, or act according to the negative stereotypes
generally applied to Blacks. The philosophy of the person who
engages in distancing is the same as that which was announced by The
Good Black’s Mungin, who described his past thinking as follows: “I
wanted to show that I was like white people: ‘Don’t be afraid. I’m one
of the good blacks.’”92
Blacks who engage in distancing realize that mere conformity is not
enough for success; one must actually actively distinguish himself or
herself from those Blacks who are deemed to be outside of the
acceptable mainstream. To these people, failure to distance one’s self
from negative racialized connotations is in fact “bad for business” — a
hindrance to advancement.93
One good example of distancing involves actions that many first and
second generation West Indian Blacks in the United States — a group
that has been designated as the “model black minority”94 — may take
92
BARRETT, supra note 56, at 6. As Yoshino explained, “In Barrett’s analysis,
Mungin strove to join a select group of individuals of African-American ancestry —
including Tiger Woods, Colin Powell, and Arthur Ashe — who are seen ‘not as
unblack but as not merely, not primarily, black.’” Yoshino, supra note 11, at 884
(quoting BARRETT, supra note 56, at 282); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 719-20 (2001) (noting in
hypothetical involving black woman at law firm that “[s]he might avoid contact with
other employees with negative workplace standing (signaling that she is not really
‘one of them’)”); Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1287-88
(explaining how colorblind norm requires “people of color to avoid other people of
color (the negative racial duty) and to associate with whites (the affirmative racial
duty)”).
93
See Whitlock, supra note 34 (noting that hip-hop style of dress for many young
black NBA players “makes people who are uninterested in or sickened by prison
culture uncomfortable”). The incentives to engage in distancing are evident in the life
of Mungin, in THE GOOD BLACK: A TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA. See generally
BARRETT, supra 56. As Professor David Wilkins explained about Mungin’s strategy to
succeed in America prior to his lawsuit, “Mungin interpreted this admonition [from
his mother to be human first, American second, and third black] to mean that the best
way for him to prove that he was indeed first and foremost ‘a human being’ was to cut
himself off from anything that might tie him in the eyes of whites to blacks — especially
‘those blacks’ who might offend whites.” David B. Wilkins, On Being Good and Black,
112 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1953 (1999) (reviewing, BARRETT, supra note 56) (emphasis
added).
94
The term “model minority” is usually used in reference to Asian Americans.
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to distinguish themselves from black Americans who descend from
slaves in this country, a group that as a whole has been negatively
stereotyped as lazy, uneducated, and incompetent.95 As several
scholars have noted, some first and second generation West Indian
Blacks make a special effort to distinguish themselves from nativeborn black Americans as a means of avoiding the full stigma and
discrimination that comes along with American blackness.96 For
“The model minority stereotype posits Asian Americans as uniquely successful among
minority groups. They work hard, save money, and achieve material success, while
their children study equally hard and earn high marks in school.” Jean Shin, The
Asian American Closet, 11 ASIAN L.J. 1, 3 (2004); see also Bob Chang, Toward an Asian
American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative
Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1264 (1993) (“In addition to hurting Asian Americans,
the model minority myth works a dual harm by hurting other racial minorities and
poor whites who are blamed for not being successful like Asian Americans.”); Frank
Wu, Changing America, Three Arguments About Asian Americans and the Law, 45 AM. U.
L. REV. 811, 813-14 (1996) (describing how myth negatively affects Asian Americans);
Sumi Cho, Misconceptions Harm Asian Americans, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 30, 2004, at C25
(analyzing how Asian Americans are harmed by “stereotypes that characterize Asian
Americans as an over-educated, over-achieving ‘model minority’ group that does not
suffer discrimination or does not deserve affirmative action”). Black Caribbeans have,
in a sense, been designated as the model black minority. See generally Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VANDERBILT L. REV (forthcoming
2007) (manuscript at 40-42, on file with author) (discussing how first and second
generation Caribbean and African Blacks are perceived differently in United States
from native black Americans with long-term roots in United States); see also MARY C.
WATERS, BLACK IDENTITIES: WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANT DREAMS AND AMERICAN REALITIES
116-23 (2001). For example, in comparing West Indian Blacks to African Americans,
one white manager explained:
They [Caribbeans] tend to shy away from doing all of the illegal things
because they have such strict rules down in their countries and jails. And
they’re nothing like [African Americans] here. So like, they’re really
paranoid to do something wrong. They seem to be very, very conscious of
it. No matter what they have to do, if they have to try and work three jobs,
they do. They won’t go into drugs or anything like that.
Malcolm Gladwell, Black Like Them, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29, 1996, available at
http://www.gladwell.com/pdf/black.pdf (citing to and quoting from study by Professor
Mary Waters of Harvard University).
95
See Michele Goodwin, Race As Proxy: An Introduction, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 931,
933 (2004) (“Color is linked with laziness, incompetence, and hostility, as well as
disfavored viewpoints, such as a lack of patriotism and disloyalty to the United
States.”); Norwood, supra note 60, at 163 (asserting that there are “negative
stereotypes that depict Blacks as poor, lazy, criminal, promiscuous, unintelligent,
and/or incompetent”).
96
See WATERS, supra note 94, at 5, 64-76; M. Patricia Fernandez-Kelly & Richard
Schauffler, Divided Fates: Immigrant Children in a Restructured U.S. Economy, 28 INT’L
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example, one woman of Jamaican descent, who believed that Whites
would treat her better if they knew that she was not a native black
American, admitted that she had her mother teach her a Jamaican
accent to use when she applied for jobs so that she could distinguish
herself from native black Americans.97
Indeed, the incentives that some Blacks have to engage in distancing
by conforming to the NBA dress code are readily apparent.
Throughout the entire debate regarding the code, those in favor of the
policy have repeatedly highlighted the need for the league’s black
players to distance themselves from what are perceived to be the bad
elements of black society — specifically, the hip-hop community.98
For example, one commentator explicitly argued that NBA players
need to distance themselves from negative images that are associated
with blackness and have been negatively racialized when he asserted:
I believe there is a race component to all of this . . . but the fact
is that when black players get into violent incidents like this
one, scads of white people recoil in horror and regard them as
thugs. . . . If [the new dress code will] play a tiny part in
keeping some kid out of the slammer or the morgue, I’d be
willing to do it. The league doesn’t need to get completely
away from hip-hop, but to distance itself from the negative
connotations of hip-hop.99

MIGRATION REV. 662, 675 (1994) (noting that success of study subjects, including
second generation black students with roots in Haiti, was “rooted in deliberate
attempts [by the students] to disassociate themselves from the stigma imposed upon
black populations in the United States through an affirmation of their national identity
and their religious fervor”).
Malcolm Gladwell has explained that “West Indians cannot escape the fact that
their success has come, to some extent, at the expense of American blacks, and that as
they have noisily differentiated themselves from African-Americans — promoting the
stereotype of themselves as the good blacks — they have made it easier for whites to
join in.” Gladwell, supra note 94. As Professor Mary Waters of Harvard University
asserted, in some instances, it is immigrant Blacks who “voice some of the worst
stereotypes and negative perceptions of American blacks imaginable.” Mary C.
Waters, The Role of Lineage in Identity Formation Among Black Americans, 14
QUALITATIVE SOC. 57, 69 (1991).
97
Waters, supra note 96, at 70.
98
See Brunt, supra note 28. Golden State guard Jason Richardson proclaimed,
“They want to sway away from the hip-hop generation. You think of hip-hop right
now and think of things that happen like gangs having shootouts in front of radio
stations.” Id.
99
Emmett Shaw, A Coming NBA Dress Code?, HOOPSWORLD.COM, Oct. 7, 2005,
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Likewise, black columnist Jason Whitlock advised young black NBA
players to engage in what Professor Regina Austin defined as the
“politics of distinction”100 within the context of criminal law, stating:
“I can’t find fault with the NBA for wanting to rid itself of prison
culture. You guys should be asking yourself why you’re embracing
prison culture. You want to be 50 Cent?”101 In other words, the players
should not want to be associated with a person who has been deemed
to be a “bad Black,” such as 50 Cent;102 instead, they must distance
themselves from him.103 The key is to highlight one’s difference from
those who carry the label of “bad Blacks.” As NBA veteran Charles
Oakley succinctly put it, “I’m not trying to sound like some old guy
who says this is the way we used to do it. Why not look professional
instead of looking like you belong on a street corner?”104
Because the act of distancing is, in many ways, a necessary extension
of accommodating, it, too, fits within the rubric of “volunteer
discrimination.” As a consequence, arguments in support of the new
NBA dress policy that emphasize the need for NBA players to
“distance” themselves from negative, racialized elements that the
league is currently associated with also lack some persuasiveness as
proof that the policy was not racially motivated.
3.

Resigned Modeling

Even for those outsiders who question the propriety of culturally
defined acceptable norms or who view such norms as steeped in
racism or racialized thinking, there is still a tremendous incentive to
simply resign one’s self to those standards, if not for one’s self, then for
the sake of the youth who look up to you. Like with accommodating

http://www.hoopsworld.com/cgi-bin/news/exec/view.cgi?archive=54&num=14487
(emphasis added).
100
Regina Austin, The Black Community, Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1772 (1992) (defining phrase as highlighting
“the difference that exists between the ‘better’ elements of ‘the community’ and the
stereotypical ‘lowlifes’ who richly merit the bad reputations the dominant society
accords them”).
101
Whitlock, supra note 34 (emphasis added).
102
See Butler, supra note 22, at 993 (noting how 50 Cent is viewed by some as
gangsta rapper).
103
See Norwood, supra note 60, at 164 n.52 (noting that “Blacks can negatively
stereotype Blacks as well”).
104
Frank Isola, Oakley Know: Sees Eddy, Knicks on Upswing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(New York), Oct. 29, 2005, at 63 (quoting Oakley).
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and distancing, what I call the act of resigned modeling helps to
highlight the incentives that some Blacks have to support the new
dress code. Indeed, in this debate concerning the racial overtones of
the new NBA dress code, some commentators, such as Charles
Barkley, openly concede that the new NBA dress policy is racially
driven,105 but still argue in its favor. The rationale of those who
engage in the act of resigned modeling is not that the racial sentiments
behind the new appearance policy are appropriate. Rather, it is that
the players, or more important, the young children who look up to the
players, must abide by culturally acceptable norms to get ahead; thus,
the players have an obligation to these children to resign themselves to
model conforming behavior. For instance, Barkley argued the
following, even though he conceded that the implementation of the
new dress code is racially motivated:
All these black kids do every single thing [the NBA players]
do. [The players] make 10 to 15 million dollars, and they can
do what they want to. Unfortunately, all of these young black
kids, when they go out dressed like that, they’re going to be
discriminated against and not get good jobs. . . . If a welldressed white kid and a black kid wearing a do-rag and
throwback jersey came to me in a job interview, I’d hire the
white kid. That’s reality. That’s the No. 1 reason I support the

105
See Mike Wise, Opinions on the NBA’s Dress Code Are Far from Uniform, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A1 (noting that Charles Barkley “acknowledged that there are
racial subtexts connected to the new dress code”). I note that Charles Barkley fits
better under the “accommodating” role or bracket of behavior in many instances. In
this debate about the NBA dress code, however, Barkley’s actions and comments best
display the act of resigned modeling. For this reason, I use his comments as an
example of resigned modeling, even though Barkley is better described as an
accommodator in other instances of his life. Moreover, one could argue that Barkley’s
political ambitions to be the Governor of Alabama provide strong incentives for him to
engage in distancing as a means of obtaining cross-racial votes. These points I have
made about Barkley’s position as one who engages in accommodating, distancing, and
resigned modeling highlight an important point about the various strategies that I
have identified as “volunteer discrimination” — behaviors that are, experientially,
often mixed together and are at least, in part, in the eye of the beholder (as
performances always are). One can think that he or she is “distancing” but may then
be read by others as “accommodating.” Consequently, despite the appearance of three
different strategies, these categories may, in fact, be more like a paint box from which
individuals choose and combine their behaviors. Like art, such actions may then
become something other than what the author intended.
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dress code.106
In essence, Blacks, like Barkley, who engage in the act of resigned
modeling, “volunteer” themselves for such discrimination, not because
they see no discrimination at all, but instead because they see no way
around it.107
106
Langston Wertz, Jr., NBA Has a Right to Set Dress Code for Its Players,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct. 26, 2005, at 2C. Of course, this statement also implies that
Barkley would not hire the white kid wearing a do-rag either. As Barnes and I have
argued, however, this action, too, is a form of race discrimination based on blackness.
Here, the white kid is discriminated against for being the “‘wrong kind’ of White,”
meaning one who performs his or her identity as a black person or can be identified
by markers heavily associated with black people — a white person who is too black.
See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 12, at 1301, 1319, 1341; see also Emily
M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through
the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455, 472-73 (2005)
(noting that key difference between “an aligned outsider and ‘immutable’ outsiders, is
that [the aligned outsider’s] conduct dictates his designated status as outsider, rather
than his status dictating his conduct”).
107
Another good example of resigned modeling is shown through the position that
some Blacks have taken in the debate over whether black parents should give their
children ethnic-sounding names.
Scholars Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil
Mullainathan conducted a recent study that revealed that simply having an African
American-sounding name significantly decreased one’s opportunity to receive a job
interview, regardless of occupation or industry. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil
Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873. Based upon
an experiment that involved sending identical, fictitious resumes with an African
American-sounding name, such as Jamal, and a white-sounding name, such as Greg,
to the same employers in Boston and Chicago, Bertrand and Mullainathan found that
resumes with white-sounding names received 50 percent more callbacks for
interviews. Id.
In the debate over black names, some Blacks take the position that, although it is
unfair for Blacks to be limited in naming their children because of discrimination that
may ensue from having a racially identifiable name, it is necessary for black parents to
give their children common, non-racially identifiable names, such as Cody or Greg, as
a means of improving their children’s chances of avoiding discrimination on the job
market.
See Dan Woog, Do “Black” Names Matter?, MONSTER.COM,
http://diversity.monster.com/afam/articles/names/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2007). During
this debate, one black journalist, Bill Maxwell, echoed comments that were strikingly
similar to Charles Barkley’s comments on the NBA dress code:

The reality is, white people joke about those names. . . . They have a
reaction when they see the name Loquisha or Tyrone. I suppose it’s OK for
entertainers. If you want to call yourself Ice Cube or Snoop Dogg, go ahead.
But most kids are not going to go into entertainment, so I don’t think we
should be putting up unnecessary barriers to employment among our kids.
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In this sense, the use of comments such as Barkley’s are the most
damaging when people cite to them in order to negate claims of race
discrimination through the policy because such comments rely upon
an explicit acceptance of racism.108 They not only acknowledge the
improper racial motives behind the policy, but they actually allow and
accept defeat based upon other racially harmful factors — in
particular, what Blacks who engage in resigned modeling see as the
inevitability of racially discriminatory standards.
III. THE DANGERS OF MISUNDERSTANDING
VOLUNTEER DISCRIMINATION
The dangers in not understanding the incentives that many Blacks
have to engage in accommodating, distancing, and resigned modeling
extend beyond the NBA. In Title VII employment cases, courts and
juries routinely cite to and rely upon contradicting testimony by black
witnesses against black plaintiffs as extremely strong or conclusive
evidence that discredits the plaintiffs’ race discrimination claims at
trial.109 For example, in upholding a district court’s finding that a
black plaintiff was not a victim of discrimination in Williams v.
Tallahassee Motors, Inc.,110 the Fifth Circuit noted the following about
the persuasiveness of the testimony by the defendant’s black witness
Early Harris, Jr., to the district court, stating:

Id. Additionally, one black mother named Tiqua Gator “named her son Derek to help
him get by in white America.” Can a “Black” Name Affect Job Prospects?, ABC NEWS,
Aug. 20, 2004, http://abcnews.go.com/2020/print?id=124232. She explained, “If I was
to have more children, it wouldn’t be any Tiquas or it wouldn’t be any Tamikas or
Aishas. It would be something common. . . . I wouldn’t want my child to go through
the same thing I’ve went through.” Id.
108
See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1291 (“[R]emaining
silent can become not only a denial of that sense of self, but also a legitimation of and
acquiescence to the implicit racial terms under which the outsider is expected to
work . . . .”).
109
See, e.g., Ellison v. Best Foods, 598 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (relying on
positive testimony from other black employees as persuasive evidence that allegations
of discrimination by other Blacks were untrue); see also Tanya Kateri Hernandez,
Latino Inter-Ethnic Employment Discrimination and the Diversity Defense, 42 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 34, on file with the author)
(describing what she calls “the Diversity Defense” in disparate treatment claims where
“legal actors immediately view a racially ‘diverse’ workplace as the equivalent of a
racially harmonious workplace”).
110
607 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1979).
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As to the fact of discrimination, the [district] court was
particularly impressed with the testimony of Early Harris, Jr., a
black employee of the defendant, who testified that he had
personally experienced no discrimination and had witnessed
no discrimination against other black employees at Tallahassee
Motors because of race.111
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit noted how the district court found this
testimony by Harris, a black witness, to be particularly convincing
despite the fact that Harris was an old Air Force friend and a recruit of
the white sales manager whom the plaintiff had accused of
discrimination in his recruiting efforts, a relationship that normally
would have made Harris’s testimony suspect (especially if Harris
himself had been white or had this case been a non-race
discrimination case).112
The point of this Essay, however, is not to say that such testimony
by Harris was irrelevant, unconvincing, or should have been
disregarded entirely; one must wonder, though, why one minority’s
view that he has not experienced discrimination in the workplace is
relevant to another minority’s individual disparate treatment claim.
Instead, the question I ask, or rather the claim I make, is that factfinders also should consider how identity performance — in
particular, the immense pressures that Blacks have in our society to
perform their identities in ways that are racially palatable — may be
motivating the contradicting black witness’s testimony. Without any
critical analysis into the motives of the contradicting black witnesses,
“black-on-black” testimony may be given too much weight in the
evaluation of a case. Indeed, as of now, at trials, judges and other
arbiters, like the district court in Williams, often assume that if the
contradicting witness in a black employee’s race discrimination case is
black, the witness lacks any motives for giving his or her opposing
testimony. Although the black witness and the black plaintiff in these
cases are usually unrelated — other than the fact that they work
together — the assumption by arbiters is one of black solidarity

111
Id. at 693 (emphasis added). When discussing witnesses, the Fifth Circuit
noted only Harris’s race. The court did not even mention the race of any other
witnesses. Id. at 693-94.
112
Id. at 693-94; see also Cummings v. Retzer & Retzer, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 400, 406
(N.D. Miss. 1986) (noting how allegations of discrimination by Blacks were
“discredited by the testimony of disinterested black witness, Fred Atkins”) (emphasis
added).
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between the two or of no bias on part of the black witness;
accordingly, the testimony of the contradicting black witness is given
tremendous weight.
The decision-makers presume that, if
discrimination were present, the black witness would identify it and
agree that it was present. There is never any hint of consideration
about how identity performances may have influenced the witness’s
testimony.
For example, in Ellison v. Best Foods,113 the district court evaluated
the merits of seven black employees’ race discrimination claims at Best
Foods. The employees alleged, among other things, that the
employer’s method of operating its plants had a disparate impact on
black employees.114 “According to the plaintiffs, black employees
advance[d] less rapidly, [were] disciplined more often, and [were]
discharged at a greater rate, than their white counterparts” under the
company’s “self-regulated work force system.”115 Under Best Foods’
work force system, employees were broken down into small teams that
were “empowered through democratic processes to make certain
decisions regarding employee discipline, working scheduling and
assignment, training, etc.”116 The plaintiffs alleged that the system
allowed an amount of subjectivity in decision-making that was
disparately harmful to Blacks, who made up only thirty percent of the
work population at the company.117 In issuing its ruling that the
plaintiffs’ race discrimination claims had successfully been refuted, the
district court emphasized that “several black employees testified that
they did not feel blacks were, or are, treated less favorably than whites
under the system” and that “[i]n fact many of the black employees
including some plaintiffs praised the system in terms of its general
operation.”118 Indeed, the district court found these black witnesses’
testimony to be so compelling as to refute the testimony of George
McCarty, a white employee who testified “that he was offended by
racist jokes that circulated the plant,”119 even though he himself
admitted “that from time to time he also told racial jokes.”120
113

598 F. Supp. 159, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1984).
Id.
115
Id. at 160, 164-65. Disciplinary decisions were first considered by the small
groups or teams and then considered by the Plant Review Board. Id. at 165-66.
116
Id. at 160, 164-65.
117
Id. at 164, 166-67.
118
Id. at 168.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 168 n.2.
114
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Again, my intent here is not to suggest that the Ellison court reached
the wrong determination in weighing the evidence or that the case was
wrongly decided. I wish only to highlight how such evidence was
given significant weight and relied upon without any consideration of
what incentives the contradicting black witnesses had to engage in
accommodating and distancing to ensure their jobs and their wellbeing within the workplace. These incentives especially rang true in
Best Foods’ self-regulated work force environment where group
consensus of co-workers was important to one’s status within the
work arena. In fact, under this self-regulated work system at Best
Foods, consistent proof that one was a team player was critical to a
worker’s success at the company. As Carbado and Gulati’s article
Working Identity suggests, for the black employees in Ellison, who
already were likely viewed as outsiders because of their race status, the
pressures to perform their identities in ways that showed them as
belonging to the inner group — as non-threatening and, most of all, as
accommodating — were immense.121 Furthermore, what better way
for “good Blacks” in Ellison to distance themselves from the “bad
Blacks” at Best Foods — to ensure that they would not be excluded
from inner circles within this self-regulated work force system — than
to testify against the complaining Blacks, and to do so in a way that
not only declared there was no race discrimination in the workplace
but that praised the employer and his work system. The fact is that
various incentives were present in Ellison for each black witness
employee at Best Foods to show, as the ultimate “good Black” Larry
Mungin often hoped to do, that he or she was an acceptable Black, a
“safe Black.” Indeed, it may have been the varying degrees of
assimilation among the black workers that accounted for their
different experiences within the workplace and thus their varying
views of discrimination.122 For these reasons, it was improper for the
121

See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1260-61, 1277-1308.
See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 701, 720 (2001) (describing how firm’s discrimination against fifth black
woman — in face of advancement of four other black women — derived “from an
intra-group distinction based on Mary’s dress, institutional identity, marital status,
professional and educational affiliations, and residence”); Flagg, supra note 3, at 201415 (discussing varying difficulties in framing disparate treatment race claims for two
sisters based on their decisions to assimilate or not assimilate into corporate culture);
Barbara J. Flagg, Selecting Black Women as Paradigms for Race Discrimination Analyses,
10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 40, 42-43 (1995) (discussing what author defines as
“transparently white” decision-making as it relates to Keisha Akbar, who chose to
emphasize her African heritage in workplace and thus “was just plain too different
122
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court to rely on these witnesses’ testimonies as though they were
nearly conclusive of the question of race discrimination without
further examination into the pressures behind their identity
performances. In other words, while it is not clear that the black
employees who testified to no discrimination in Ellison were engaged
in “volunteer discrimination,” the possibility that they were so
engaged was present; thus, the evaluation of their testimony without
further scrutiny of these potential, race-based influences was
incomplete and dangerous.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while I understand the appeal of using comments from
black players and journalists who support the new NBA dress code as
a means of negating racial stereotyping claims, I wish to highlight the
dangers in using them in a forceful way to defeat other Blacks’ claims
of racism. After all, many of these comments and actions themselves
may be influenced by racism. In particular, these comments may be
the result of race-based incentives that Blacks have not only to prove
themselves worthy of inclusion by conforming to racialized norms of
appearance, but also to distance themselves from those who do not
conform. In this sense, such comments and actions work only to
reinforce racialized hierarchies and norms.123
Moreover, the use of such comments and actions as determinative
proof of no racial motivations ignores the fact that some of the Blacks
who have made these comments in support of the policy (not all of
them) may be “victims” of racial discrimination themselves, precisely
because of the immense incentives they may have to consciously
engage in the acts of accommodating, distancing, and resigned
modeling.124 The same applies for witnesses who provide “black-onblack” testimony. In this sense, Blacks who perform these acts may be
prisoners of their own racial performances, locking themselves into
roles of perpetual accommodation and distancing while also alienating
themselves from other Blacks, such as those who choose to challenge
what may be racialized appearance standards or workplace norms.
As a black professional, I, in many ways, relate to this impulse to
from white folks to be made a department head”).
123
See Cooper, supra note 9, at 902-03.
124
See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 3, at 1262 (arguing that “the
kinds of work outsiders often feel pressured to do because of negative assumptions
about their identities . . . is a form of employment discrimination”).
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engage in resigned modeling, and even distancing and
accommodating. For example, although I believe that the new NBA
dress code itself is motivated by racial stereotypes, I do not question
whether it is wise, in our society, for the league to impose the policy
or for the players to follow it, precisely because I, too, feel the impulse
to resign myself to model conforming behavior. In fact, I understand
and even acknowledge the great impulse for me and other Blacks to
engage in accommodating or distancing. But, the fact that I feel and
understand these impulses and even engage in these acts, whether
consciously or unconsciously, does not mean that they are not
premised upon racism. I, too, “volunteer” myself for discrimination
nearly every day of my life. That reality, however, does not militate in
favor of using my behaviors or those of other conforming Blacks as
proof of no discrimination.125
The irony here is that the hip-hop culture that so many of us,
including the NBA, wish to distance ourselves from does not “practice
a politics of respectability” but instead, at times, challenges it.126 As
Professor Paul Butler has explained, “[u]nlike civil rights culture, hiphop . . . is as concerned with fairness for drug sellers as for the lawabiding middle class people who are stopped by the police for ‘driving
while black’ or ‘driving while brown.’”127 In this sense, there may be a
lesson to be learned from the hip-hop community about resistance to
mainstream norms.
At the least, the claim by some Blacks that the NBA dress code is
good or is not improperly motivated by race is not a slam dunk in
favor of a finding of no discrimination. In order to truly combat
racism, one must examine these claims of racism separate and apart
from the actions of the policy’s black supporters and focus on the way
in which appearances in general have been racialized — the way in
which race generally infects our judgments about professionalism,
including appearance standards.128 Even Commissioner David Stern
125
See Caldwell, supra note 49, at 393 (explaining that “[w]hat appears to be
merely an aesthetic judgment” for people of color is “part of the[ir] subordination”).
126
See Butler, supra note 22, at 1015 (“Unlike civil rights culture, hip-hop . . .
champions the human rights of criminals as enthusiastically as the rights of the falsely
accused.”). I note, however, that many types of inequities, such as sexism and
homophobia, exist in certain types of hip-hop.
127
Id.
128
See MOLLOY, supra note 52, at 233 (“It is unfortunate but true that our society
has conditioned us to look upon [Blacks] as belonging to the lower classes, and no
matter how high a minority individual rises in status or achievement he is going to
have some difficulty being judged by his success rather than his background.”);
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acknowledged the way in which race may affect judgments of the NBA
in general (although not within the context of the dress code) when he
stated:
I think it’s fair to say that the NBA was the first sport that was
widely viewed as a black sport. And whatever the numbers
ultimately are for the other sports, the NBA will always be
treated a certain way because of that. Our players are so visible
that if they have Afros or cornrows or tattoos — white or black
— our consumers pick it up. So, I think there are always some
elements of race involved that affect judgments about the
NBA.129
What is critical here is that we analyze the policy in a way that
comports with the realities of race and its functions in our society —
that we look at race as it is broadly defined, not only through skin
color but through other markers such as dress and clothing. We need
to understand racism as a set of interlocking social institutions and
norms rather than as a mere attitude. Otherwise, we just may be using
one form of “volunteer discrimination” to then impose a clearly
involuntary form of discrimination upon others — either in the NBA
or other workplace environments.

Caldwell, supra note 49, at 381 (questioning how companies arrive at their
“conception of a business-like image” and considering role of race and sexuality in
building those conceptions); see also Houh, supra note 7, at 911 (“That a non-minority
insider need not negotiate his racial status by altering his conduct in the workplace,
that he need not do the extra identity work that an outsider is expected to do,
demonstrates just how normalized his culture and experiences in the workplace are,
and the extent to which workplaces can function as materially and ideologically
colonized and colonizing spaces.”); Peller, supra note 73, at 762 (“I believe that the
failure of the progressive and liberal white community to comprehend the possibility
of a liberating rather than repressive meaning of race consciousness has distorted our
understanding of the politics of race in the past and obscures the ways that we might
contribute to a meaningful transformation of race relations in the future.”).
129
Michael Lee, NBA Fights to Regain Image: One Year Later, Brawl Leaves a Mark
Throughout League, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2005, at E1.

